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Abstract
This paper applies a principal-agent model of delegation, agency and agenda setting to the 1996
intergovernmental conference and the Treaty of Amsterdam, in order to understand both the
delegation of powers to supranational organizations in the new Treaty, and the efforts of such
organizations to set the agenda for the conference. At Amsterdam, the member governments of the
European Union delegated new powers to the Commission, the Court of Justice, and especially the
European Parliament; these new powers, however, are carefully hedged with elaborate mechanisms
to control, if not eliminate, supranational autonomy in the future. In the intergovernmental
conference, moreover, the EU’s supranational organizations attempted to influence the outcome of
the negotiations as informal agenda setters, but they were limited in their ability to do so by the
information-rich content of the IGC. However, while the influence of the Commission, Court and
Parliament was indeed limited in the intergovernmental conference and at Amsterdam, we should
beware of generalizing from IGCs to the day-to-day workings of EU politics, where the powers of
the supranational organizations are far greater than in any intergovernmental conference.
Kurzfassung
Dieses Papier wendet auf die Regierungskonferenz 1996 und den Vertrag von Amsterdam ein
principal-agent-Modell der Befugnisübertragung, des Handelns und des Agendasetting an, um
sowohl die Übertragung von Befugnissen auf die supranationalen Organe im neuen Vertrag als auch
die Bemühungen solcher Organe, die Agenda der Konferenz zu bestimmen, zu verstehen. In
Amsterdam übertrugen die EU-Regierungen neue Befugnisse auf die Kommission, den Gerichtshof
und im besonderen auf das Europäische Parlament; diese neuen Kompetenzen sind allerdings
sorgfältig durch ausgeklügelte Mechanismen begrenzt, um die supranationale Autonomie in Zukunft
zu kontrollieren, wenn nicht sogar zu beseitigen. Darüber hinaus versuchten die supranationalen
Organe der EU in der Regierungskonferenz das Ergebnis der Verhandlungen als informelle
Agendasetter zu beeinflussen, waren jedoch darin durch die Informationsdichte der IGK behindert.
Obwohl der Einfluß der Kommission, des Gerichtshofs und des Parlaments in der
Regierungskonferenz und in Amsterdam in der Tat sehr beschränkt war, sollte nicht der Fehler
gemacht werden, von IGKs auf die Alltagsgeschäfte der EU-Politik zu schließen, da die
supranationalen Organe dort bei weiten einflußreicher sind als in einer IGK. 
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1
Intergovernmental conferences, such as the 1996 IGC that culminated in the Treaty of Amsterdam,
are by definition dominated by the member governments of the European Union. Yet the
supranational organizations of the Union – the Commission, Court of Justice and European
Parliament – are clearly involved with intergovernmental conferences, both as the objects of
delegation and as subjects attempting to influence the outcome of the negotiations. In this paper, I
apply a principal-agent model of delegation, agency and agenda-setting to the 1996 IGC and the
Treaty of Amsterdam in order to understand both the delegation of powers to supranational
organizations at Amsterdam and the efforts of such organizations to set the agenda for the
conference.
The paper is arranged in four parts. In the first part of the paper, I summarize briefly a principal-agent
model of delegation to, and agency and agenda setting by, supranational organizations like the
Commission, Court, and Parliament. The second part of the paper then examines EU supranational
organizations as the objects of delegation in the Amsterdam Treaty, surveying both the delegation of
new powers to the EU's supranational organizations and the new control mechanisms established by
the member governments to limit the autonomy of these organizations. In Part III, the focus shifts to
the Commission, Court and Parliament as subjects – or, in the terms of principal-agent analysis, as
informal agenda setters – attempting to influence the outcome of the negotiations. Finally, in Part IV,
I examine the implications of the Amsterdam Treaty for principal-agent analysis of the European
Union, arguing that such an analysis allows us to make sense of the member governments' delegation
of new powers to supranational agents, the new and byzantine control mechanisms created to limit
supranational autonomy, and the very limited causal influence of EU supranational organizations as
1 von 19 29.04.99 15:17
EIoP: Text 1999-006: Full text http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1999-006.htmagenda setters in the negotiations.
I. Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EU
Principal-agent analysis is derived from, and is a specification of, rational choice institutionalism.
Principal-agent analysis is a middle-range theory, which, as applied to international institutions such as
the EU, focuses specifically on three questions: (1) why do member-state principals delegate powers
to supranational agents? (2) how and to what extent can member states control the behavior of the
agents they create? and (3) how and to what extent can supranational agents set the agenda for their
member-state principals? In this section I analyze each of these questions in turn.
1. Why do member governments delegate?
The first step in understanding supranational organizations is to understand why member states –
understood here as the primary actors or principals – create and delegate powers to organizations like
the Commission, Court and Parliament – their agents – in the first place(1). Principal-agent analysis
provides a useful theoretical framework for understanding such an act of delegation. The basic
approach of principal-agent models to the question of delegation is functionalist. That is to say,
principal-agent analysis explains the choice to delegate powers to an agent in terms of the functions
that the agent is expected to perform and the effects on policy outcomes it is expected to produce(2).
In general terms, principal-agent models of delegation have identified four functions for which
principals might choose to delegate authority to an agent such as the supranational organizations of
the European Union. 
2
First, supranational agents may monitor member state compliance with international treaty
obligations. In the context of collective action under imperfect information, supranational agents can
monitor compliance and provide information to all participants, in effect “painting scarlet letters” on
member states that fail to comply with their treaty obligations. 
Second, supranational agents may solve problems of “incomplete contracting.” If we consider
international treaties as a contract, we can say that the parties to that Treaty (i.e. the member states)
pledge in the contract to behave in certain ways in the future. However, as Oliver Williamson (1985)
points out, all but the simplest contracts are invariably incomplete, since it would be impossible (or at
least prohibitively costly) to spell out in detail the precise obligations of all the parties throughout the
life of the contract. For this reason, member state principals may decide to create an agent, such as a
court, to fill in the details of the contract and adjudicate disputes about its meaning.
Third, supranational organizations, like U.S. regulatory bureaucracies, may be delegated authority to
adopt regulations that are either too complex to be considered and debated in detail by the principals
or that require the credibility of a genuinely independent regulator who, unlike the governments of
the states in question, would have little incentive to be lenient with firms in a given member state.
Fourth and finally, principals may have an incentive to delegate to an agent the power of formal
agenda setting, that is, the ability of a given actor to initiate policy proposals for consideration by the
principals. As McKelvey, Riker and others have shown, any majoritarian system in which each and
every participant had the right to initiate proposals would lead to an endless series of proposals from
disgruntled participants who had been in the minority in a previous vote. To avoid such “cycling,”
they argue, actors might decide to delegate formal agenda setting power to a single actor, who would
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formal agenda setting responsibilities also convey considerable power to the agenda setter, even if that
agenda setter is formally a mere “agent” of the principals.
In a previous article, I surveyed the powers delegated to the EU’s supranational organizations in the
1957 Treaty of Rome, the 1986 Single European Act, and the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on European
Union, arguing that the functional model yields strikingly accurate predictions regarding the functions
delegated to the Commission and the Court, whose primary tasks do indeed concern monitoring,
interpreting and elaborating incomplete contracts, credible regulation, and agenda setting. However,
the functionalist model fails almost completely at predicting the powers delegated to the European
Parliament, including its legislative and its budgetary powers. Clearly, the functionalist model fails to
account for the ideological concern for democratic legitimacy that has led member governments to
assign increasingly significant powers to the Parliament in successive Treaty amendments (Pollack
1997: 106-107). Later in this paper, we shall see that this pattern also holds for the new powers
delegated to the Commission, Court and Parliament at Amsterdam.
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2. Control mechanisms and supranational agency
Under certain circumstances, therefore, member state principals might be expected to delegate – and
indeed have delegated – authority to supranational agents such as the Commission, Court and
Parliament. However, this initial act of delegation immediately raises another problem: What if the
agent behaves in ways that diverge from the preferences of the principals – a problem referred to as
“shirking”? In the European Union case, what if the various supranational organizations were to
develop an independent preference for greater integration, as indeed a number of scholars have
suggested they have (Cram 1993; Ross 1995: 14), and used their delegated powers to advance the
integrationist cause beyond the preferences of the member states that created them? This is the central
problem of principal- agent analysis, namely the conditions under which agents are free to act on their
own preferences, rather than those of their principals.
Fortunately – at least for the principals – principal-agent models point out that the principals are not
helpless in the face of this dilemma. Rather, when delegating authority to an agent, principals can also
adopt administrative and oversight procedures to limit the scope of agency activity and the possibility
of agency shirking. Administrative procedures define ex ante the scope of agency activity, the legal
instruments available to the agent, and the procedures to be followed by it. Such administrative
procedures may be more or less restrictive, and they may be altered in response to shirking, but only
at a cost to the flexibility and comprehensiveness of the agent’s activities. 
Oversight procedures, on the other hand, allow principals ex post to (a) monitor agency behavior,
looking for any possible instances of shirking, and (b) influence agency behavior through the
application of positive and negative sanctions. With regard to monitoring, for example, McCubbins
and Schwartz (1984) suggest that principals may use any of a number of oversight mechanisms,
including the “police-patrol” method of standing oversight committees, and the “fire-alarm” oversight
offered by individual constituency complaints and judicial review of agency behavior. As for
sanctioning, the literature points out that principals enjoy a formidable array of sanctions, including
control over budgets, control over appointments, overriding of agency behavior through new
legislation, and revision of the agency’s mandate. Through the use of such monitoring and the
application of sanctions, much of the literature argues, both shirking and slippage by agents can be
minimized, if not eliminated.
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for principals as well as agents, and these costs can create some limited room for agency autonomy
from principals. Monitoring, for example, can consume significant time and resources, and yet fail to
cover more than a small cross-section of agency activities. Perhaps more importantly, the application
of sanctions by principals is not automatic, but generally requires a positive decision by the principals,
and it is here that the agent can exploit conflicting preferences among its principals to escape
sanctions and pursue its own preferences – in the EU case, integrationist preferences – within limited
bounds. Thus, for example, if a decision to sanction a supranational agent requires a majority (or even
a unanimous) vote among member state principals, then the agent may drift considerably from the
Council’s ideal point, as long as it does not call forth the requisite majority (or unanimity) required for
the imposition of sanctions. In practical terms, for example, it is possible that the Council of Ministers
might, in response to agency shirking by the Commission, sanction the Commission or overturn its
decision by qualified majority, and examples of such sanctioning can indeed be found in the
day-to-day business of EU policymaking (Pollack 1998). By contrast, the revision of the
Commission’s mandate in the Treaty is considerably more difficult, requiring unanimous agreement
among the member governments and ratification by national parliaments and electorates. For this
reason, Treaty revision is essentially the “nuclear option” – exceedingly effective, but difficult to use –
and is therefore likely to be used only rarely and only in cases of flagrant supranational shirking
against the unanimous will of the member states.
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For the purposes of the current paper, the foregoing analysis generates two general hypotheses about
intergovernmental conferences such as the 1996 IGC. First, to the extent that the member states
delegate new powers to the EU supranational organizations, we should expect them to adopt
administrative and oversight mechanisms to control shirking by their supranational agents, particularly
in sensitive areas in which governments wish to avoid the creeping extension of EU competence.
Second, the model presented above also suggests that member governments are likely to attempt to
use intergovernmental conferences as a means to sanction supranational agents, but that such attempts
are unlikely to be successful given the need for a unanimous vote among the member governments.
We shall examine both of these questions in some detail below, but first, we need to move on to the
third part of the theory, namely the issue of agenda setting.
3. Agenda setting by supranational actors
Much of the literature on the EU’s supranational organizations focuses on their purported ability to
“set the agenda” for the member states of the Union. This literature often runs into conceptual
confusion, however, because different analysts use the term “agenda setting” to refer to two different
types of activities. For the sake of analytic clarity, therefore, I distinguish between formal and
informal agenda setting. Put simply, formal agenda setting refers to the ability of an actor to set the
procedural agenda of a legislature by placing before it legislative proposals that can be adopted more
easily than they can be amended, thus structuring and limiting the choices faced by of a group of
legislators. Informal agenda setting, by contrast, is the ability of a “policy entrepreneur” to set the
substantive agenda of an organization, not through its formal powers, but through its ability to define
issues and present proposals which can rally consensus among the final decisionmakers. Let us
consider each, very briefly, in turn.
Formal agenda setting
In the terms established by rational choice theories, formal agenda setting relies most basically on the
right of certain institutional actors to propose legislation for a vote in a legislative body. In the US
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source of their disproportionate influence within their respective jurisdictions. In the European
Community, by contrast, the Treaties assign the sole “right of initiate” for most (but not all)
Community legislation to the Commission, placing the Commission in the role of the Community’s
formal agenda setter(3).
The right to propose, however, is not sufficient to ensure agenda setting power. The influence of an
agenda setter will, ceteris paribus, be greatest where the voting rule is some sort of majority vote, and
where the amendment rule is restrictive – in other words, where it is easier to adopt the agenda
setter’s proposal than to amend it. Applied to the Community, this analysis of agenda power with
different voting rules and amendment rules yields varying results depending on the rules governing a
given piece of Community legislation. In the Community pillar of the EU, the Commission almost
invariably possesses the sole right of initiative, and the Council always requires a unanimous vote in
order to amend a Commission proposal. However, the voting rule in the Council, and the role of the
European Parliament, vary considerably depending on the legislative procedure specified for a given
issue-area. 
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For example, under the consultation procedure, both the amendment rule and the voting rule in the
Council are unanimity. Thus, although it is difficult for the member states to amend a Commission
proposal, it is equally difficult to adopt the proposal, and any member state may veto a proposal with
which it is unhappy. The Commission’s agenda setting power under the consultation procedure is,
therefore, minimal or non-existent. Similarly, the European Parliament must be consulted, but the
Council is under no legal obligations to take its proposed amendments into account.
By contrast, the cooperation procedure established by the Single European act confers upon the
Commission a considerable agenda setting power. Under the cooperation procedure, the amendment
rule remains unanimity, making a Commission proposal difficult to amend; but the voting rule is
qualified majority, meaning that the Commission need only put forward a proposal capable of
garnering the support of a qualified majority in the Council in order to secure its preferred outcome.
In addition, the cooperation procedure also provides some limited agenda setting power to the
Parliament, which may propose amendments to the Council’s draft legislation. These amendments, if
accepted by the Commission, then become part of the Commission’s amended proposal, and can be
adopted in the Council by QMV, but rejected only by unanimity. In other words, the EP gains some
“conditional” agenda setting power under the cooperation procedure (Tsebelis 1994), but the
Commission remains the middle-man in the procedure, without whose cooperation the Parliament’s
amendments enjoy no special status.
Finally, the co-decision procedure created at Maastricht establishes a similar agenda setting power for
the Commission and Parliament, with one important difference: In its second reading, the Parliament
may by an absolute majority of its members re-insert amendments to the Commission’s revised draft.
The Council may then accept the Commission’s amendments, or else convene a “conciliation
committee” bringing together delegations from both the Council and the Parliament to reconcile their
differences in a final draft, which then returns to the two bodies for approval. Under the Maastricht
Treaty, both bodies would then need to approve the final draft, unless the Council reaffirmed its
original position in its “third reading” by a unanimous vote. Thus, beyond its original agenda setting
role, the Parliament gained the right to veto legislation, unless the Council was unanimous in its
position.
Informal agenda setting
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agenda setting does not rely on the formal powers of an organization, but rather on the ability of a
“political entrepreneur” like the Commission to set the substantive agenda for the member states, by
identifying policy problems, proposing and “selling” policy proposals, and brokering compromises
among the member states on the terms of the policies ultimately adopted. This model of informal
agenda setting derives largely from Kingdon’s (1984) seminal work in the American context, which
relies fundamentally on the existence of imperfect information among policymakers. That is to say,
when policymakers have difficulties identifying policy problems and solutions – or indeed, identifying
their own preferences on a given issue! – a policy entrepreneur may secure the adoption of a policy,
and influence its content, by stepping forth at the right time (a “policy window”) with a proposal that
identifies a common problem and proposes an acceptable solution.
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According to Kingdon, a successful policy entrepreneur should have three main characteristics: (1) the
person (or organization) should be taken seriously, as an expert or leader; (2) the person must be
known for her political connections or negotiating skills, and (3) the successful entrepreneur must be
persistent and wait for the opening of a policy window. In the EU context, the role of policy
entrepreneur can therefore be played by member governments, by non-governmental actors such as
the European Round Table of Industrialists, or by the EU’s supranational organizations, to the extent
that they possess these characteristics. All else being equal, Kingdon’s model would lead us to suspect
that the informal agenda setting power of supranational organizations is greatest where information is
imperfect, uncertainty about future developments is high, and the asymmetrical distribution of
information between supranational organizations and member governments favors the former.
Applied to the Amsterdam Treaty, the foregoing discussion of formal and informal agenda setting
clarifies, and specifies the conditions for, supranational agenda setting by the Commission, Court and
Parliament. In an IGC, supranational organizations possess no formal agenda-setting powers of any
kind. Thus, to the extent that they might wish to influence the outcome of the conference, each of
these organizations would have to behave as a political entrepreneur, identifying problems and
proposing solutions that might rally a unanimous consensus among the governments participating in
the conference. Their ability to do so, however, is dependent on the existence of imperfect
information or unclear preferences among the member states, and on an asymmetrical distribution of
information in favor of supranational organizations. These criteria are clear and demanding – and they
were not met in the 1996 IGC, as we shall see presently.
II. Delegation and Agency in the Treaty of Amsterdam
Summing up the previous section, the principal-agent approach to supranational organizations
provides us with a compelling set of questions, and a preliminary set of hypotheses, about (1) the
sorts of functions likely to be delegated in an intergovernmental conference like the 1996 IGC; (2) the
sorts of control mechanisms likely to be established by member states when they delegate, and the
difficulty of using Treaty amendment as a control mechanism to sanction previous behavior; and (3)
the (limited) ability of supranational organizations to act as informal agenda setters for the member
governments in an IGC. 
In this section, I examine the first two questions of “delegation” and “agency,” analyzing the nature of
the powers delegated to supranational organizations at Amsterdam and the control mechanisms
established by states to control their supranational agents. My argument here is twofold. First, as with
the earlier treaties, the functional model seems to fit the new powers of the Commission and Court
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wider consideration of democratic legitimacy. Secondly, however, the member governments
accompanied this delegation of new powers with new and byzantine administrative and oversight
mechanisms designed to limit supranational activism in the future, especially in the “communitarized”
pillar three issues of visas, immigration and asylum. A complete account of the IGC negotiations is, of
course, beyond the scope of this short paper, but consider, very briefly, the new powers delegated to,
and the new control mechanisms imposed upon, each of the three primary supranational
organizations.
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Commission
At first glance, the Treaty provisions dealing with the Commission seem modest. If we examine the
Treaty provisions relating directly to the Commission, the most notable changes are the slight increase
in the powers of the Commission President, whose nomination will be confirmed directly by the
European Parliament, and who will have a greater role in selecting and apportioning portfolios to his
fellow Commissioners. In other articles of the Treaty, however, the member governments opted to
delegate to the Commission a range of new powers which can be grouped under the rubrics of
monitoring and agenda setting, respectively. 
In terms of monitoring, the Commission has traditionally played the role of “guardian of the Treaties,”
in particular through its ability to challenge member states for non-compliance with EU law before the
European Court of Justice (Article 169 EC). Under the Amsterdam Treaty, the Commission’s role as
the guardian of EU law is extended both to the “communitarized” issues of free movement, asylum
and immigration, and to a lesser extent to the remaining third-pillar issues of police and judicial
cooperation, where the Commission will share with the member governments the ability to challenge
the acts of the Union before the Court of Justice.
The Commission’s formal agenda setting role is also enhanced in a number of areas, although the
extent of Commission power, and the control mechanisms established to prevent shirking, vary across
four sets of articles:
First, there are a number of first-pillar areas in which the Commission’s agenda setting power is
increased by the adoption of qualified majority voting in the Council. In these areas – which
include a few existing provisions such as research and technology policy as well as new articles
relating to employment, social exclusion, and equal opportunities for men and women – the
Commission will enjoy the formal agenda setting powers described above. 
Second, for the “communitarized” issues of free movement, immigration and asylum, the
Commission has been granted a joint right of initiative with the member states during the first
five years after the Treaty takes effect, during which time the member states will vote by
unanimity in the Council. During these first five years, therefore, the Commission’s formal
agenda-setting powers will be nonexistent, since its proposals will enjoy no special status in the
Council. After five years, the Commission will gain its sole right of initiative, and the member
states may decide, by a unanimous vote, to move to qualified majority voting in the Council,
which would provide the Commission with the sort of formal agenda-setting powers it enjoys
elsewhere in pillar one. Thus, for the first five years of the new Treaty, the Commission will
effectively be “on trial” in its proposals to the Council, which will weigh its decision to move to
QMV accordingly. 
Third, in the remaining third pillar issues of police and judicial cooperation, the Commission
also gains joint right of initiative alongside the member states. In third-pillar issues, therefore,
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Commission’s proposals enjoy no special status, and its formal agenda setting powers are
therefore minimal or nonexistent. 
Fourth and finally, the Commission gains an important new agenda setting power in the new
Treaty provisions on flexibility or “enhanced cooperation” in the first and third pillars. In the
first pillar, member states may present a request to the Commission, which will submit a
proposal only if it believes that all the criteria established in the Treaty are met. In effect, the
Commission, as the guardian of the Treaties, is granted both agenda setting and gatekeeping
power, i.e. the ability to prevent certain proposals from being considered if, in the
Commission’s opinion, those proposals would weaken the institutional coherence of the Union.
In the third pillar, by contrast, the Commission does not enjoy a formal gatekeeping role, but
even here the Commission must present an Opinion to the Council regarding the proposed
“enhanced cooperation.” 
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In this context, it is also worth noting that several member states put forward proposals to the IGC
that would have weakened the Commission’s agenda setting powers in existing Treaty articles, either
by extending the right of initiative to member states, or by allowing Commission proposals to be
amended by a qualified majority vote in the Council. In the end, however, these proposals met with
strong resistance from several member states (including especially the smaller member states, which
regard the Commission’s right of initiative as insurance against domination by the larger members),
and none of these proposals survived in the final text of the Treaty (Petite 1998; interview with Carlo
Trojan, February 1999).
Summing up the new Treaty provisions on the Commission, the member governments continued in
Amsterdam to delegate monitoring and agenda-setting powers to the Commission, as in earlier
Treaties. However, the degree of agenda setting power delegated to the Commission varies sharply
depending on the sensitivity of the issue-area, and the proliferation of new formulae (joint right of
initiative, the five-year trial period) reflect member-state concern to limit the Commission’s autonomy
in these new and sensitive areas. 
The European Court of Justice
In terms of the functions specified in the principal-agent analysis above, the primary function of the
European Court of Justice is to solve problems of incomplete contracting, by interpreting the
incomplete provisions of primary and secondary EC law and by arbitrating disputes among the
member states, supranational organizations, and private citizens asserting their rights under EC law.
The Treaty of Amsterdam extended these traditional functions to the “communitarized” issues of free
movement, asylum and immigration, and to the remaining “third pillar” issues of police and judicial
cooperation, respectively. The delegation of new powers to the Court is most extensive in the
communitarized issues, but in both areas the delegation of new powers is accompanied by new and
novel mechanisms to limit judicial discretion:
In the communitarized issues of free movement, asylum, and immigration, the Court will enjoy
its traditional powers to interpret the Treaty and arbitrate disputes, but with three significant
restrictions (spelled out in Article 73p). First, within the new communitarized issues,
preliminary rulings may be sought only by the highest courts in each member state, not by lower
courts as in the existing Article 177; this provision was designed nominally to avoid flooding
the Court with immigration and asylum cases, but in effect it closes off access to the ECJ by
lower courts, which have played a vital role in the expansion of EC law over the past four
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maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security.” Third and finally, the
Council, Commission, or Member States may request the Court to give a ruling on the
interpretation of the Treaty provisions or of any acts based on these provisions, but the ruling of
the Court “shall not apply to judgements of courts or tribunals of the Member States which
have become res judicata.” In this way, the Treaty guards against functional creep of ECJ
jurisprudence from areas of free movement into areas of criminal law and internal security. 
In the remaining third pillar issues of police and judicial cooperation, the Court is given limited
jurisprudence to interpret the Treaty provisions and subsequent decisions taken under the third
pillar; however, the safeguards and limitations on the Court are even more byzantine, reflecting
the sensitive nature of third-pillar issues. Thus, the Court gains the right to review the legality
of decisions taken under the third pillar, as well as jurisdiction to rule on disputes between
member states or between the Commission and member states on the interpretation of
third-pillar decisions; put differently, the Court gains the power to interpret the incomplete
contract of Article K, which governs the operation of the remaining third pillar. However the
right to bring such cases is restricted to the Commission and the member states, and excludes
both the European Parliament and private actors. Furthermore, the new Article K establishes
only a weak, optional version of the preliminary ruling procedure, whereby Member States may
issue a declaration stating that they accept the jurisdiction of the Court, in which case national
courts may (but need not) request preliminary rulings from the Court in third-pillar areas. 
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Here again, then, we see continued delegation of new powers to the Court to solve problems of
incomplete contracting and adjudicate future disputes about the interpretation of the Treaty and of
future provisions in the area of Justice and Home Affairs, coupled with the adoption of new and
byzantine control mechanisms to limit the judicial activism of the Court of Justice and its reach into
the various national legal orders. The second pillar, furthermore, remains outside of the Court’s legal
purview. Nevertheless, despite the plethora of new control mechanisms imposed on the Court in the
area of Justice and Home Affairs, the United Kingdom delegation failed in its early and
well-publicized attempt to roll back the powers of the Court in established areas (c.f. Alter 1998), and
there was no repeat of the “Barber Protocol” in the Maastricht Treaty, in which the member states
explicitly and deliberately used the IGC to overturn a controversial ruling of the Court. Thus, while
the Court’s new powers are hedged around with restrictions, its existing powers under the EC Treaty
were left untouched and inviolable at Amsterdam.
The European Parliament
By all accounts, the European Parliament emerged as the clear “winner” of the Amsterdam Treaty,
with a considerable extension of Parliamentary powers relating to EU legislation and to oversight of
the Commission. The new powers delegated to the Parliament are wide-ranging and have been well
catalogued elsewhere (c.f. Falkner and Nentwich 1997; Duff 1997: 142-151; European Parliament
1997; Petite 1998), and so we need cover only the highlights here.
The first and arguably the most important Treaty provisions regarding the Parliament concern the
extension of the co-decision procedure to some 23 new and existing articles, including public health,
research and development, the environment, equal opportunities and equal treatment, measures to
counter fraud, incentive measures for employment, and a number of provisions relating to the internal
market. In addition, the Council may, in five years and by a unanimous vote, decide to extend the co-
decision procedure to the communitarized issues of free movement, asylum, and immigration. These
provisions effectively eliminate the cooperation procedure (which remains only in the Treaty articles
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co- decision. 
A second and related change in Amsterdam is the rewriting of the co-decision procedure, which is
simplified considerably with streamlined procedures and new time limits to ensure speedy decision-
making. The most important of these changes is the elimination of the so-called “third reading” in
which the Council could reaffirm its position if conciliation failed. This provision had been widely
attacked by the Parliament for introducing an imbalance in the institutional positions of the Parliament
and Council, and its removal effectively makes the EP and the Council equal partners in the legislative
process where co-decision applies.
A third important change in the Amsterdam Treaty is the change to Article 158(2) EC, according to
which the European Parliament gains the right to approve the nomination of the incoming
Commission President. Under the Maastricht Treaty, the Parliament possessed the right to approve
(and to sack) the Commission as a body, but could not approve the President individually. According
to the new Treaty, the Parliament will now approve – and no doubt hear testimony from – the
nominee for President, who will then select his colleagues in cooperation with the member states; the
Parliament will then hold a second vote on the Commission as a college. This amended nomination
process, together with the Parliament’s existing power to sack the Commission as a body, is likely to
ensure a Commission more attentive to the concerns of Parliament as well as of the member states.
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Examining these new powers of the Parliament, only the last (i.e., controlling the Commission)
appears to fit among the functions predicted by principal-agent models of delegation. The extension
and simplification of co-decision, by contrast, is surprising in terms of principal-agent models, and is
explicable only in terms of the ideological preferences of the member states for democratic control of
EU institutions, just as I have argued in a previous analysis (Pollack 1997), and as Moravcsik and
Nicolaidis (1998) conclude in their analysis of the Treaty.
Nevertheless, the importance of democratic ideology should not be overemphasized. Moravcsik and
Nicolaidis argue that the effects of delegating co-decision power to the Parliament are uncertain, and
it is this uncertainty which leaves room for ideological considerations to play a role. Yet the likely
effects of delegation to Parliament are not entirely uncertain, nor were the member states
indiscriminately ideological in their delegation of new powers to the EP. Thus, at the same time that
the member states were expanding considerably the reach of the co-decision procedure, they
deliberately limited the powers of Parliament in other areas. For example, the original consultation
procedure, which gives the Parliament no formal agenda-setting powers vis-a-vis the Council, was not
only retained for existing Treaty provisions, it was also adopted for a number of new provisions,
including the new Article 6A on non-discrimination, various articles relating to the communitarized
issues of asylum and immigration, several provisions of the new title on employment, the new
flexibility arrangements under the first pillar, and most of the remaining third-pillar issues. The EP is,
moreover, excluded entirely from a number of provisions regarding flexibility, immigration,
employment policy, the social chapter, and – perhaps most importantly – the future amendment of the
Treaties, where the Parliament had requested the right to assent to all future Treaties under Article N
of the Union Treaty. Even among the articles governed by the co-decision procedure, the Council
opted to maintain unanimous voting in the Council for four sensitive areas (freedom of movement and
residence; social security for migrant workers; rules governing professions; and culture). Finally, the
IGC failed to address two issues which had been put on the agenda by inter-institutional agreements
at EP insistence, namely the reform of comitology and of the budgetary process (Falkner and
Nentwich 1997: 2). In sum, the member states were clearly motivated primarily by democratic
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member states were careful to calculate the likely consequences of delegation, and to withhold
additional powers where the Parliament could be expected to be significantly more activist than the
Council.
What then can we conclude from the pattern of delegation and agency at Amsterdam? Four findings
emerge clearly from the above analysis. First, the member states at Amsterdam continued their pattern
of delegating new powers to the Commission and Court for the functions of monitoring, agenda
setting, and interpreting incomplete contracts. Second, the member states seem to have been
motivated once again by ideological concerns in their delegation of significant new powers to the
European Parliament, although the member states were careful to withhold significant delegation of
powers where the EP could be expected to diverge systematically from member-state preferences.
Third, the member states accompanied this new delegation of powers with the most complex system
of administrative and oversight mechanisms in EU history, in order to minimize, if not eliminate,
supranational activism in the future. Fourth and finally, however, disgruntled member states were
unable to win the unanimous agreement of the IGC to retrench the powers of the Commission or the
Court of Justice: the nuclear option went unused at Amsterdam.
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III. Supranational Agenda Setting at Amsterdam
As the objects of delegation, therefore, all of the EU’s supranational organizations gained new powers
in Amsterdam, notwithstanding the elaborate control mechanisms established to minimize the risks of
supranational agency in the future. But how did the Commission, Court, and Parliament influence the
negotiations as subjects, as political entrepreneurs seeking to set the agenda for the decisions
ultimately taken by the fifteen member governments? 
If we return to principal-agent analysis, we can see that the question of supranational agenda- setting
in IGCs is not a binary question of influence or no influence – as it has often appeared in the debate
between neofunctionalists and intergovernmentalists – but a question of predicting the conditions
under which supranational organizations like the Commission, Court and Parliament are likely to be
able to set the agenda for the member states. The prediction of principal-agent analysis in this case is
clear: by contrast with the everyday legislation process in the EU, intergovernmental conferences
provide supranational organizations with no formal agenda setting powers at all: not only do member
governments take the final decision on the contents of the Treaty (as they do in everyday legislation),
but the proposals of the Commission, Parliament and Court have no special status in the negotiations;
the Parliament and Court are excluded from the negotiations entirely; and none of the supranational
organizations possesses the ex post power of assent over the outcome. Under these circumstances, the
agenda-setting powers of the EU’s supranational organizations are strictly informal, and rely on the
ability of such organizations to propose “focal points” around which member governments can
converge in an environment of imperfect information and unclear member state preferences. 
In the case of the Single European Act, these conditions were met. In the run-up to the negotiation of
the Single Act, Jacques Delors and his Internal Market Commissioner Lord Cockfield strategically
selected the completion of the Internal Market (rather than Delors’ sincere preference for EMU) as
the project most likely to rally the unanimous approval of the member governments; presented the
“1992" program to the member governments as a coherent package; and mobilized a transnational
coalition of multinational corporations in favor of the initiative. The Commission also presented to the
hastily convened 1985 intergovernmental conference a detailed and pragmatic set of proposals which
served as the basis for negotiation among the member governments. The Single Act, therefore, most
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preferences and a sophisticated strategy, facing member states with varying and unclear preferences
toward the internal market, institutional reform, high-tech cooperation, and the menu of other policy
options facing the member governments in the mid-1980s(4). As Moravcsik (1998) points out,
however, we should beware of generalizing from the Commission’s success in the Single Act to the
question of supranational agenda setting more broadly. By contrast with the stunning success of the
Delors Commission in 1984, for example, the European Parliament’s sincerely federalist “Draft Treaty
on European Union” appears to have made little impression and had little influence on member
governments which did not share the Parliament’s federalist theology.
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Similarly, if we move from the negotiation of the Single Act to the Maastricht Treaty, we see a more
complex and less clear-cut instance of Commission agenda-setting. For example, many scholars have
pointed to the entrepreneurial activities of Jacques Delors in the late 1980s in pressing for Economic
and Monetary Union, and later in chairing the Delors Committee of central bankers which produced
the basic three-stage blueprint of EMU as it eventually appeared in the Maastricht Treaty (c.f. Ross
1995; Endo 1999). Here again, however, Moravcsik correctly points out that Delors’ influence on
EMU was limited by the technically expert central bankers who made up the majority of the Delors’
committee, and above all by the clear and dominant preferences of the German government, which
essentially dictated the terms of EMU as it appears in the Treaty. Faced with technically expert central
bankers and member states with clear preferences, Delors was able to exert a leadership role as the
chairman of the Delors Committee, but he was not able to influence significantly the content of the
Treaty provisions, which represent the “monetarist” views of the German Bundesbank rather than
Delors’ own “economist” views. 
The second 1991 IGC on political union was an even less propitious environment for the Commission,
since it was called with little advance notice by the member governments rather than by any
supranational organization; in this context, the Commission responded late and overreached in its
proposals, and was consequently marginalized in the negotiations (Moravcsik 1998: 432-471). The
changed dynamic between the Single Act and Maastricht was perhaps best summarized by
Jean-Charles Leygues, a member of Delors’ cabinet, who characterized the differences as follows:
Before we could count on being ahead of other people strategically. We knew what we wanted and
they were less clear, partly because they didn’t believe that anything much would follow from the
decisions we asked them to make. Now they know that we mean business and they look for all the
implications of our proposals. There are huge numbers of new things on the table and it will be much
tougher going from now on (quoted in Ross 1995: 137).
How about Amsterdam? To what extent were the supranational organizations of the EU able to act as
entrepreneurial agenda-setters for the 1996 intergovernmental conference? 
At first glance, it might seem as if the Commission, Court and Parliament were highly effective agenda
setters in the 1996 IGC. By comparison with past intergovernmental conferences, the Commission,
the Parliament and (to a lesser extent) the Court were given numerous opportunities to influence the
preparation and negotiation of the Amsterdam Treaty. During the first half of 1995, all three
organizations (plus the Council of Ministers and the European Court of Auditors) presented reports
on the working of the Maastricht Treaty in preparation for the IGC (Commission 1995; European
Court of Justice 1995; European Parliament 1995). Later, during the second half of 1995, the
Commission and the European Parliament were both represented on the Reflection Group of member
state representatives appointed to prepare the agenda of the conference. The European Parliament
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Throughout these stages of the conference, moreover, the Commission and Parliamentary
representatives are widely considered to have behaved in a responsible, realistic, and pragmatic
manner. For example, Michel Petite, the head of the Commission’s IGC Task Force, characterized the
Commission’s strategy as “setting its sights on the upper range of what it considered realistic” (Petite
1998: Introduction). Rather than sincerely proposing its preferred outcome regardless of the
preferences of the member governments, the Commission acted strategically, anticipating the
preferences of the member governments and proposing Treaty provisions which it believed might
attract their unanimous support. Similarly, the European Parliament generally eschewed the visionary
federalism of the 1984 Draft Treaty in favor of more moderate and pragmatic resolutions in advance
of the conference. The EP’s representatives to the Reflection Group, Elizabeth Guigou (PES-France)
and Elmar Brok (EPP- Germany), were also widely praised for their pragmatic contribution to the
Reflection Group(5). The Court of Justice was similarly restrained in its report to the Reflection
Group, limiting itself to a few modest proposals on the judicial system of the EU, and insisting on the
independence of the judiciary and the inviolability of the preliminary reference procedure in Article
177 (European Court of Justice 1995). Put simply, the Commission, Court, and Parliament had
learned from previous IGCs that grandiose federalist proposals would simply be ignored by the
member states, and that only practical proposals capable of garnering the unanimous agreement of the
member states would be taken seriously by the conference. In the language of rational choice theory,
all of the EU’s supranational organizations behaved strategically, rather than sincerely, in their
proposals to the 1996 IGC. 
Yet, if the Commission, Court and Parliament approached the 1996 IGC with greater pragmatism and
sophistication than past IGCs, they did so in an information-rich context relatively unconducive to
entrepreneurial agenda setting. Pace scholars such as Lord and Winn (1998) and Mazey and
Richardson (1996), the member governments of the EU had years of advance notice regarding the
approach of the 1996 IGC, and therefore possessed relatively good information about the workings of
the Maastricht Treaty and their own broad preferences regarding the new treaty to be negotiated. As
Moravcsik and Nicolaidis (1998) point out, the member states therefore had remarkably clear and
stable preferences over the outcome of the Treaty, even if they waited in some cases until the
end-game of the negotiations to present specific negotiating positions on secondary issues. In this
information-rich context, the opportunities for entrepreneurial agenda-setting by supranational
organizations were correspondingly weak, as predicted by principal-agent analysis.
Not surprisingly, then, there are few if any “smoking guns” of Commission, Court or Parliament
influence on the negotiation of the Amsterdam Treaty. To be sure, the Commission and Parliament in
particular were active throughout the preparation and negotiation of the Treaty, offering opinions,
holding hearings, and taking part in formal and informal discussions with member-state
representatives in the Reflection Group and in the conference itself. But activity is not influence, and
we should beware of attributing a causal role to supranational institutions too readily. Indeed, if we
adopt Moravcsik’s standard that supranational organizations must make proposals to the conference
that were “both unique and successful,” then there is little direct evidence of supranational influence
on the Treaty. By and large, the proposals of the Commission, Court and Parliament were designed to
capitalize and build upon an emerging consensus among the member states on the various issues, with
the result that supranational proposals often reproduced the welter of proposals submitted by the
member states to the IGC, rather than serving as the “constructed focal point” around which
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Consider, for example, the Commission’s Opinion to the IGC, put forward on the eve of the
conference in February 1996. In his 1998 assessment of the Treaty, Michel Petite points out the
similarities between the Commission’s Opinion and the Amsterdam Treaty in areas such as
employment, social policy, Justice and Home Affairs, and the role of Parliament – yet it would be a
mistake to adduce from this correlation that the Commission actually influenced the negotiations in
these areas. Indeed, because the Commission was (by Petite’s own account) acting strategically and
rationally anticipating the likely positions of the member governments, it is more plausible that the
Commission’s Opinion reflected member-state views than vice-versa(6). Furthermore, as Moravcsik
and Nicolaidis (1998) point out, the Commission failed to secure some of its key objectives for the
conference in areas such as qualified majority voting, the number of Commissioners, the weighting of
votes in the Council, and the Commission’s failed bid to include services and intellectual property
rights within the ambit of Article 113. Even where the conference did adopt new provisions in areas
suggested by the Commission, moreover, the content of those provisions – whether in social policy,
employment, or Justice and Home affairs – was often much weaker than the proposals put forward by
the Commission.
The causal role of the European Parliament and Court of Justice are similarly difficult to establish with
any certainty. The European Parliament, for example, received a considerable extension of powers, as
we have seen, making it a “winner” in the process of Treaty reform; yet here again it is difficult to
argue that the new Treaty provisions are attributable to the Parliament as a subject and agenda-setter,
rather than as the object of delegation by member states concerned about democratic legitimacy. The
Parliament, moreover, like the Commission, failed to achieve a number of its key aims for the Treaty,
and its initial reaction to the Amsterdam Treaty was one of disappointment. The European Court of
Justice, finally, arguably established the status quo ante for the conference as a result of its rulings on
subjects such as fundamental rights, positive discrimination, and the Community’s common
commercial policy (c.f. Niemann and Edwards 1997; Meunier and Nicolaidis 1998); yet the Court’s
1995 Report seems to have had little impact on the actual negotiation of the Treaty. 
This is not to say that supranational organizations had no impact at all on the negotiation of the
Amsterdam Treaty. Within the intergovernmental conference, most of the negotiations took place on
the basis of papers prepared by the Presidency, with the support of the Council Secretariat and, to a
lesser extent, the Commission (McDonagh 1998: 209). In this context, one senior Commission official
has argued that the Commission did play a significant behind-the-scenes role in defeating any attack
on the Commission’s right of initiative, and in shaping the Treaty provisions on employment and on
the “communitarized” issues of asylum, visas and immigration (interview with Carlo Trojan, 16
February 1999). This sort of behind-the-scenes interaction with a sympathetic Presidency may indeed
have provided a channel of influence to the Commission, as well as to the Parliament, which also met
regularly with the Presidency throughout the conference. However, final judgment about such
influence should be reserved pending further research and interviews with both supranational and
governmental officials.
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Summing up this section, it seems reasonable to conclude that, despite the professionalism and
activity of the Commission and the European Parliament prior to and during the 1996
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organizations played more than a secondary agenda-setting role in the Treaty of Amsterdam – an
assessment shared, in large part, by the Commission and Parliamentary officials involved in the
negotiations (interviews with Commission and European Parliament officials, July 1997, October
1998, and February 1999). This outcome, however, should not be considered surprising in light of the
principal-agent model outlined earlier in the paper. By contrast with the day-to-day workings of EU
politics, intergovernmental conferences provide supranational organizations with none of the formal
agenda-setting powers that the Commission and the Parliament enjoy in most EU legislation. Put
simply, intergovernmental conferences stack the deck in favor of member governments at the expense
of the Commission, the Parliament, and the ECJ, which can only attempt to influence the outcome as
informal agenda setters on the sidelines of the conference. We should, therefore, beware of
generalizing from the outcome of a single intergovernmental conference to the broader universe of
principal-agent interactions in the EU – a point to which I shall return presently.
IV. Conclusions 
What can we conclude from this necessarily cursory examination of delegation, agency, and
agenda-setting in the 1996 intergovernmental conference and the Treaty of Amsterdam? First, in
terms of delegation, the member governments of the EU continued at Amsterdam to delegate new
powers to the Commission, the Court of Justice, and most strikingly to the European Parliament.
Once again, as in previous treaties, the delegation of powers to the Commission and Court fall within
the functions outlined in principal-agent models, but the delegation of legislative powers to the
European Parliament is explicable only in reference to the ideological concern for democratic
legitimacy in a number of member states. Second, however, this new delegation of powers was in
each instance circumscribed by a number of new and novel control mechanisms, including new
provisions for shared a Commission- Council right of initiative, new limitations on the ability of lower
courts to refer cases to the Court of Justice in “communitarized” third-pillar issues, and other limits
on ECJ jurisdiction in the remaining third pillar issues. Third and finally, the Commission, Court and
Parliament all experienced great difficulty in influencing the agenda of the Amsterdam Treaty in the
information-rich context of the 1996 IGC, in contrast to the extraordinary role played by the Delors
Commission in the negotiation of the Single European Act. 
More generally, the progression of events from the Single Act to the Amsterdam Treaty demonstrates
that both the member states and the supranational organizations of the EU are strategic actors: thus
the EU’s supranational agents, having learnt from the mistakes and overreaching of the Maastricht
Treaty, moderated their demands (if not their underlying preferences) in the 1996 intergovernmental
conference, in order to avoid being marginalized; similarly, the member governments also learned
from previous principal-agent interactions, delegating new powers to their supranational agents while
at the same time limiting the ability of these agents to pursue an integrationist agenda that diverges
significantly from their own.
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Finally, let us return to the inter-paradigm, or rather multi-paradigm, debate within the field of
European integration studies. To what extent does the rational-choice, principal-agent approach taken
in this paper “fit” with the approaches adopted by other analysts of the 1996 IGC and the Amsterdam
Treaty? In terms of its theoretical assumptions, the approach taken here fits most closely with the
liberal intergovernmentalist approach of Moravcsik (1998) and Moravcsik and Nicolaidis (1998). Like
liberal intergovernmentalism, the principal-agent approach is rationalist in its assumptions and places
the member governments at the center of the analysis, although clearly more attention is directed at
the relationship between those member governments and their supranational agents. Furthermore, like
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their own and each other’s preferences, placing limits on the ability of the Commission, Court, and
Parliament to act as entrepreneurial agenda-setters. 
However, to generalize from the 1996 IGC that supranational organizations are causally unimportant
would represent a particularly egregious case of selection bias. Intergovernmental conferences are
only one step in an ongoing sequence of principal-agent interactions, and they are a highly atypical
step, in which the “hand” of the member governments is strongest, and that of the EU’s supranational
organizations is weakest. In this context, it is hardly surprising that the Commission, Court and
Parliament struggled to influence the 1996 IGC on terms set by the member governments, or that the
member governments established control mechanisms to minimize agency slack in future delegation of
powers. Rather, in principal-agent terms, what is most striking is the willingness of member
governments to delegate new powers – especially to the European Parliament – and the failure of
disgruntled member governments to use the IGC as a tool to rein in an activist Commission and
Court. More generally, one might argue that the real test of supranational autonomy and influence will
come not in the 1996 IGC itself, but rather in the use made of the new treaty powers by the
Commission, Court and Parliament in day-to-day EU policymaking. Thus, a real test of supranational
autonomy and influence would need to examine a representative sample of principal-agent interactions
in the EU, not simply the occasional, and unusual, IGCs, in which the member governments play the
game with a home-team advantage.
In this regard, the principal-agent approach adopted here shares empirical interests with the
neofunctionalist, multi-level governance, and garbage-can approaches, all of which focus on the role
of supranational actors in day-to-day EU politics. Yet, in spite of their common interest in the
empirical phenomenon of supranational agency, I would argue that the neofunctionalist, multi-level
governance, and garbage-can approaches are all characterized by significant theoretical and
methodological weaknesses. Neofunctionalist theory, for example, pioneered concepts such as
supranational entrepreneurship and cultivated spillover; yet the theory fails to specify conditions for
supranational influence. Similarly, multi-level governance is arguably the most descriptively accurate
model, in the sense that it directs our attention to the full range of national, supranational and
subnational actors involved in the EU policy process and the IGCs. Yet here again, the model fails to
specify which actors, at which levels, will be causally important, and when; it is this question that the
principal-agent approach seeks to answer. Lord and Winn’s garbage-can approach, finally, nicely
points up the importance of imperfect information and weak preferences and the opportunities that
these phenomena create for supranational agenda setters. In the case of the Amsterdam Treaty,
however, Lord and Winn overstate the radical indeterminacy of member state preferences. Indeed, as
Moravcsik and Nicolaidis point out, the underlying preferences of member governments in the 1996
IGC were remarkably stable over time (the occasional electoral shift notwithstanding), and there is
little empirical evidence to support the claim that member governments “discover” their preferences
through interaction at the EU level. 
In short, the neofunctionalist, multi-level governance and garbage-can approaches all direct our
attention at important empirical phenomena, but each has theoretical and methodological problems
which make those approaches questionable places to begin our analysis. By contrast, the
principal-agent approach taken here begins with the parsimonious microfoundations and
state-centrism of liberal intergovernmentalism, and works from this basis to build an institutionalist
theory capable of generating testable hypotheses about the complex interactions of the various actors
– governmental as well as supranational – that constitute European Union politics. 
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Endnotes
(1) For an extended discussion of the issues raised in this section, see Pollack 1997.
(2) In this regard, the analysis here is similar to Moravcsik’s (1998) discussion of “credible
commitments,” but is more explicit about the specific types of functions or powers likely to be
delegated to supranational agents.
(3) By contrast, the Commission has not had the sole right of initiative in the second and third pillars
of the EU, with which it has been only loosely associated.
(4) Good Commission-centric accounts of the Single European Act can be found in Zysman and
Sandholtz (1989); Dehousse and Majone (1994); and Ross (1995).
(5) McDonagh, for example, characterizes “The Parliament’s strategy [as] at once upbeat and realistic
involving a targeted focusing on key issues rather than a scatter-gun approach. The Parliament’s
striking sensitivity to the concerns of all Member States... enhanced its credibility” (McDonagh 1998:
59).
(6) In fairness, Petite himself admits that “It is difficult to assess the importance of this formal
statement of position by the Commission” (Petite 1998: Introduction).
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